

# INTRODUCTION

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## MILITARIES IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS Theories and the Case of Indonesia

One of our greatest challenges now is to sideline the military from politics. They have dominated our political system, our society, our economy for too long.... It is now time for us civilians to take charge and reform the foundations of this nation.

Amien Rais, June 1998<sup>1</sup>

My party cannot rule this country alone. I need a partner ... with a wide network to win the people's hearts, somebody strong and with charisma. He has to be from TNI. My second reason for choosing a military man to run as my vice-presidential candidate is to safeguard the national integrity of the whole of Indonesia's wide territory.... We are really grateful to TNI.

Amien Rais, September 2003<sup>2</sup>

Indonesia's political system has undergone dramatic structural change since the 1998 downfall of the New Order regime that had ruled the country for more than three decades. A multitude of political parties has replaced the tightly controlled three-party system; free and fair elections were held that resulted in three successive coalition governments with a weakening presidency; political power was transferred from the once omnipotent centre into the

regions; the previously sacrosanct constitution was extensively rewritten; civil society organizations have mushroomed; and one of the most diverse media landscapes in Asia has emerged. One area that has seen some of the most significant changes is the security sector. Indonesia's armed forces (TNI, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) had to give up their institutional engagement in politics, accept their removal from the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, People's Representative Council) and the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Assembly),<sup>3</sup> and were mandated by law to reduce their role in domestic security affairs. The police, formerly a part of the armed forces, were separated from the military and assigned the task of managing internal security.

The extent of institutional reform affecting Indonesia's security sector has led some observers to the conclusion that "the civil-military balance has tilted against the military, and state-soldier relations are in the midst of substantial change" (Alagappa 2001a, p. 16). In this view, the reform movement has weakened the armed forces substantially, rushing in a new class of civilian politicians that has taken charge of the country. Yet other analysts have stated as recently as 2006 that "there is a widespread belief that military reforms have so far only been superficial and that further reform would require a more committed leadership than the one currently in power" (Nyman 2006, p. 168). Such highly diverse assessments, which are also reflected in veteran politician Amien Rais's conflicting statements cited earlier, are not only an expression of disagreements between scholars in evaluating the successes and failures of military reform efforts after 1998. More importantly, they suggest that the process of military reform in Indonesia has been anything but a linear and stable development. Apparently, there were remarkable fluctuations in the quality of democratic civilian control of the armed forces in different periods of the post-Suharto era, mirroring the ebbs and flows of the reform process as a whole. Influenced by a variety of internal and external factors, the pace and scope of change within the armed forces differed under each of the four post-Suharto governments. Yudhoyono, for example, exercised significantly better control over the armed forces than his predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Exploring the reasons for these differences and fluctuations will be a major purpose of this book.

The complexity of the military's new role in the post-Suharto polity does not only pose difficult challenges to Indonesia's democratic governments, but also to the theoretical debate on democratic transitions in general. The existing literature on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states has found it difficult to grasp the oscillating dynamics of military influence on evolving democratic polities. Classic theories on military intervention

in politics have largely focused on open interventions by the armed forces and the formal mechanisms of their political participation. These theories are insufficient, however, to describe the fluid power relations in emerging political systems, with militaries often using their non-institutional powers to gain access to political and economic resources. More recent models, on the other hand, have used a predominantly normative approach, proposing reform steps that countries in post-authoritarian transitions have to introduce in order to establish democratic control over their militaries. Theorists of this school have set the concept of democratic governance of the security sector as a normative ideal that allows them to identify diversions (and their causes) in particular countries. The ideal often proves difficult to achieve, however, with even some developed democracies failing to meet the benchmarks set up by the theorists. This creates problems in defining the very specific conditions faced by countries that have only recently emerged from decades of military-backed rule. Thus while both the classic and normative theories have captured some important aspects of the role militaries can play in post-authoritarian politics, it appears necessary to expand the existing models to tackle the complex case of Indonesia.

This book is a study of civil-military relations in post-Suharto Indonesia. It discusses the causes and consequences of the country's problematic attempt to establish democratic control of the armed forces as a major agenda of its post-authoritarian reform programme. The book is structured in four main parts, each containing parallel chapters on developments in military politics and civilian affairs. The idea to structure the narrative and analysis chronologically in parallel military and "civilian" chapters was born out of my intense engagement with the literature on civil-military relations. As this introduction will show, the outcome of civil-military transitions is not only determined by internal military reforms and the changing attitudes in the officer corps. Developments within civilian politics are equally important, with the quality of democratic governance, the level of intra-civilian fragmentation, and the use of state coercion playing a huge role in shaping civil-military relations. Accordingly, this book analyses the two sides of civil-military relationships in separate yet parallel discussions. In order to further narrow down the focus, I chose to analyse developments in political Islam as a means to demonstrate general patterns of civilian politics in Indonesia's transition. Many of these patterns are visible in other segments of the civilian polity as well, such as the internal dynamics of secular-nationalist or non-Muslim groups, but the choice of intra-Muslim affairs as a case study offered numerous opportunities to highlight broader trends in civilian constituencies that impacted on the quality of Indonesia's civil-military relations after 1998.

In this context, it is important to note that this book is *not* a study of the special interaction between the military and political Islam. The fact that the armed forces and their individual officers occasionally forged alliances with Islamic leaders and groups to serve their vested interests is touched upon in this study, but it does not constitute its main focus. Instead, the book emphasizes how developments *within* the Muslim community have influenced civil-military relations. In particular, it points to political, ideological, and social divisions between Islamic groups that have destabilized civilian politics both before and after the 1998 regime change, allowing the armed forces to consolidate their position. The book also demonstrates, however, how the declining tensions between Muslim groups after 2004 contributed to the stabilization of the civilian polity, which consequently translated into improved civilian democratic control of the armed forces under the Yudhoyono presidency. Accordingly, while the manipulation of both extremist and mainstream Muslim groups by the armed forces during the New Order and in the early post-Suharto transition is an interesting phenomenon and deserves detailed scholarly attention, it is marginal to the theme explored in this book.

The discussion of the literature on civil-military relations presented in the following section also led to three additional propositions that shaped the structure of this book. First of all, the insight that the level of engagement of the armed forces in political affairs rises and falls with fluctuations in the effectiveness of civilian governance suggested that a chronological approach is best suited to capture the erratic developments in Indonesia's post-1998 civil-military affairs. The quality of democratic civilian control over the military differed greatly under Presidents Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono, and only a chronologically structured analysis can pinpoint the causes for these differences.

The second important proposition emerging from the review of the literature is the importance of historical legacies for current civil-military affairs. As a result, the first part of this book (Chapters 1 and 2) discusses the historical background of Indonesian military politics and intra-Islamic developments respectively, and although the two parallel chapters do not present new research material, they provide readers with the necessary information to contextualize the discussion of more recent events in the subsequent parts.

Finally, the significance of the character of regime change for the dynamics of post-autocratic civil-military relations requires that this study provide a detailed analysis of the events that triggered the democratic transition in 1998. Thus the second part of the book (Chapters 3 and 4) examines the 1998

transfer of power from Suharto to his successor, and its consequences for the pace and quality of the post-authoritarian transition. As further explained in this introduction, the discussion of the regime change is followed by parts three (Chapters 5 and 6) and four (Chapters 7 and 8) of the book, which analyse both Indonesia's transition between 1998 and 2004 and the phase of democratic consolidation after Yudhoyono's rise to power.

## DEMOCRATIC VS CIVILIAN CONTROL

Democratic control of the armed forces is one of the key factors in successful transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Militaries that have supported, participated in, or dominated authoritarian regimes are likely to be crucial players in the transition, trying to preserve as many of their previous political and institutional privileges as possible. In order to minimize the military's influence on the shaping of post-authoritarian political structures, it is a major challenge for civilian forces to quickly initiate the establishment of constitutional mechanisms that put democratically elected, civilian state institutions in charge of all aspects of governance, including the security sector. While O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 32) have asserted that it is "civilian control" that is most important in democratic transitions, recent discussions put more stress on the quality of civilian control, and how it is achieved and exercised. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2001, p. 4), writing on transitional processes in Eastern European states and the former Soviet republics, propose that what really matters is the "control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state". Accordingly, it "concerns more than the simple maximization of civilian power over the military, and is fundamentally about the democratic legitimacy, governance, and accountability of a state's civil-military relationship". Democratic control of the military is, therefore, best understood as an inter-institutional process in which legitimate state bodies authorize the structure, size, function, and use of the armed forces (Callaghan and Kuhlmann 2002, p. 4). Civilian control, on the other hand, can be undemocratic if exercised by civilian forces not sufficiently legitimized through proper democratic procedures. In some cases, the establishment of civilian control by only one dominant civilian element in the post-authoritarian transition can reinforce the very manipulability of the armed forces that the regime change aimed to remove.

The distinction between "civilian" and "democratic" control of the armed forces will prove crucial in discussing the Indonesian case. The transitional process in Indonesia has seen several presidents making attempts to use the armed forces in the competition with their political opponents. Such

examples underline the necessity of further defining what exactly democratic control of the armed forces entails. The first level of explanation concerns the decision-making on military policy. In a democratic state, such decisions are made by the openly and freely elected executive in coordination with the legislature. By entrusting the decision-making process to an institutionalised system of checks and balances, the possibility that a single political actor can gain monopolistic power over the military is reduced. Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is the most crucial element in this level of democratic control, with the legislature approving defence-related policies, adopting legislation, and allocating the budget for the military (Born 2003). Countries in transition often face difficulties in empowering their legislatures to exercise these control functions properly, due to a variety of reasons ranging from lack of expertise in military affairs to divisions within the political elite. The second level is related to the implementation of decisions made by political authorities through the bureaucracy. As Edward Page (1992, p. 174) has outlined, the adequate implementation of political decisions made by state institutions is a major element of functioning democracies. In terms of controlling the military, the department of defence is the bureaucratic tool through which policy decisions are translated into concrete action on the ground. In military-backed authoritarian regimes, armed forces officers thus often seek to establish unchallenged dominance over the defence bureaucracy. This deliberate exclusion of civilian defence officials can lead to serious problems in the subsequent democratic transition (Fedorov 2002, p. 16), and post-Suharto Indonesia is a case in point. Finally, the third level of democratic control highlights the importance of societal scrutiny of the armed forces, largely exercised through civil society groups and the media. Their participation in the management of defence policy and its implementation are crucial additions to the traditional concepts of “civilian control”.<sup>4</sup>

The extent of military adherence to these three levels of democratic control is determined by the quality of the civilian institutions that oversee them. Successful empowerment of civilian leaders, and effective cooperation between them, is likely to result in the acknowledgement of democratic control by the military leadership. On the other hand, problems in the establishment of civilian state and societal institutions, whether provoked by sabotage, inter-civilian disputes, indifference, or lack of expertise, are almost certain to encourage the armed forces to disobey or ignore orders by civilian control authorities. This inter-connectivity between empowerment of civilian state institutions and democratic control of the armed forces has led most recent authors on the subject to integrate democratic control into the broader concept of “security sector reform” (Ball 2001; Bland 2001; Smith

2001). The inclusion of democratic control into the concept of security sector reform is important for the clarification of two major issues. First, it defines military reform as part of a larger process of reforming not only other security institutions (police, armed militias, forces of executive agencies), but the system of governance as a whole. It links the success of establishing democratic control of the armed forces with the levels of consolidation shown by both the democratically authorized state institutions and those security agencies charged with carrying out the functions previously monopolized by the military. Second, it clarifies that the “key civil-military problem in the post-authoritarian state” is not only, as Alagappa (2001*b*, p. 54) put it, “the need to curb the military’s political power”, but also to guarantee that this reform process does not result in an erosion of general security conditions. Such erosion is likely to undermine the project of democratic consolidation, and includes the possibility that the public will demand the retention of military powers unless other credible alternatives are presented.

The expansion of traditional theories on “civilian control” to the more comprehensive concepts of “democratic control” and “security sector reform” carries significant methodological consequences for this study, and has played an important role in defining its scope. It suggests that the interaction between civilian forces, i.e., their struggle for control of the political institutions and the fora of civil society, are as important to the outcome of the civil-military reform process as the classic concentration on corporate interests of the military.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, it will be one of this book’s tasks to analyse how the relationships and rivalries between civilian groups have affected the chances of establishing democratic control of the armed forces. At the same time, the application of the concepts will provide important normative evaluation tools regarding the reform steps Indonesia has taken in its process of democratic consolidation. Where the notion of “civilian control” would fail to grasp the complexities of the relationship between the executive, the military, and other civilian forces, the norms and standards enshrined in the model of democratic control are much more likely to identify those areas where the reform efforts have produced insufficient results to carry the process forward, and are therefore more useful in determining Indonesia’s place in the comparative scheme of civil-military transitions.

The discussion so far has identified democratic control of the armed forces as a crucial element of security sector reform and, ultimately, processes of democratic transition and consolidation. The literature on this topic is of a largely normative nature, with authors giving recommendations to countries in transition regarding reform measures they are expected to take and the risks they should avoid. In contrast, the academic exchange on the causes

and dimensions of military interventions in politics has been vast, and filled with numerous case studies from the 1950s to the 1990s. Samuel E. Finer (1985, pp. 23–24) argued that theories on military intervention in politics could be negatively applied in order to explain military non-intervention or “extrusion”. While this is not entirely true, the description of the various causes of military intervention in politics, the different models of military-state relations, and the theoretical approaches to the downfall of military-backed regimes provide an important background for this book. In particular, the analysis of the last area, the disintegration of authoritarian governments, not only delivers invaluable insights into the socio-political patterns of regime change, but can also explain their repercussions for the ensuing periods of democratic transition and consolidation.

## AREAS OF MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Before discussing the various models of military intervention in politics, it is important to introduce the political, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural sectors of state organization in which militaries traditionally seek to exert influence. The description of these areas, and the opportunities of intervention they offer, will make it easier to identify diversions from the normative model of democratic control of the armed forces, and will provide analytical tools for the analysis of the Indonesian case. First, and most important, is the participation of the military in the political institutions of the state. In countries where democratic control of the armed forces has been established, the military is part of the political process only in terms of submitting policy options if the civilian authorities ask for such advice, and implementing the policy militarily once the relevant decisions have been made. Military officers may, of course, exert political influence by voting in general elections, lobbying politicians, shaping public opinion by engaging with the media, or aligning themselves with civil society organizations or think tanks. Such interventions remain, however, within the democratic political framework. In non-democratic states, on the other hand, militaries have not only tried to influence the decision-making process, they have used coercion to put pressure on state institutions, have pushed for participation in legislatures and executive bodies, and, in some cases, have taken over government. Koonings and Kruit (2002, p. 19) have outlined two major motivations for military interventionism in political institutions:

First, there is the notion that the military institution is exceptionally well placed not only to defend but also to define the essence of the nation by birthright and competence. Second, the military “knows” that “civilians”,

that is to say, civilian politicians, the institutional framework of civic governance, the actions of societal interest groups, and the overall political culture tend to be inadequate to address the needs of the nation.

These interventions transform the armed forces from an advisory and executive instrument of the state into a decision-making institution, with the corporate interests of the military becoming an important element in general governance. As a result, the institutional set-up of the state is fundamentally changed.

The second area where militaries tend to seek involvement in is the economic sector. George Philip (2001, p. 74), for example, pointed to the importance of “economic fiefdoms” for “bureaucratically autonomous and politically interventionist” militaries in South America between 1925 and 1982. In this field, analysts have differentiated between two types of intervention: first, the economic activities aimed at raising funds for the operational costs of the military and the personal enrichment of its officers; and second, the engagement in national development projects, boosting the political legitimacy of the armed forces and institutionalizing their role in governance. The first type of engagement includes military-owned businesses and cooperatives, stakes in large conglomerates that seek security and political protection in return, illegal activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, backing of prostitution and gambling, and involvement in natural resource-extraction (Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. xix). The second type of socio-economic activity is of a developmentalist nature: the military participates in programmes such as the building of crucial infrastructure, family planning and public health, management of sports and youth organizations, education in rural and remote areas, and disaster relief. These activities grant the armed forces access to non-military items within national and regional budgets, increase the participation of military personnel in governance, and help to legitimize political intervention in the eyes of society. The Indonesian military has been deeply involved in both types of economic activity, complicating attempts to subordinate it to democratic civilian control after 1998. In Indonesia as well as in other countries with problematic militaries, the extent to which the armed forces are independent from financial resources provided by the state is reflective of the position military officers can assume in their interaction with civilian state institutions (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003, p. 16).

The third field of military intervention is related to the institutional and organizational autonomy of the armed forces. Often the involvement of

militaries in the two areas mentioned earlier — the participation in political institutions and the economy — are functions of the inherent tendency of the armed forces to protect and expand their institutional autonomy. Military officers are inclined to view issues of defence management, such as force structure and size, purchase of equipment, senior appointments, and the development of military strategies, as matters of internal organization rather than policy fields directed by civilian authorities. This belief is based on what Peter D. Feaver (2003, p. 68) called the “information asymmetries in civil-military relations”, which points to a level of technical expertise of the armed forces in the “management of violence” that civilian controllers do not possess. The drive for institutional autonomy can lead militaries to seek direct participation in or control of state institutions in order to limit their intervention opportunities vis-à-vis the armed forces (Nordinger 1977). Similarly, the involvement of militaries in the economic sector is often motivated by their desire to remain financially independent from the control institutions of the state.

There are, however, two areas of institutional autonomy in which even participation in political institutions or budgetary independence can prove insufficient to prevent interference by civilian forces: first, the authority over senior appointments and second, decisions on major defence and security policies made by civilian state institutions. In many post-authoritarian states, the control over appointments constitutes the only civilian bargaining power in the interaction with militaries that have preserved large elements of their institutional and organizational powers built up under the previous regime. The confrontation between civilian appointment authority and the institutional power of the military often leads to civil-military negotiations over the terms of the transition (Hernandez 1996, p. 72). These negotiations can result in alliances between civilian power-holders and military leaders aimed at establishing new forms of semi-authoritarian rule. Alternatively, civilians may concede organizational autonomy to the armed forces in exchange for their support of the democratic transition, just as Presidents Habibie and Megawati did in Indonesia after the 1998 regime change.

Besides institutional autonomy, militaries also often seek jurisdiction over the formulation and implementation of defence and security policies. In his study on the armed forces of Chile, Gregory Weeks (2003, p. 15) described this area as “highly salient” for the military. Many militaries view it as their prerogative to manage the security of the state, insisting that civilians are politically too divided or do not possess the necessary skills to be left in charge of national security issues. In transitional states, militaries

tend to utilize their organizational autonomy to obstruct decisions on security matters made by civilian authorities. Unable to influence the decision-making process itself, and aware that overthrowing the government is politically unfeasible, the armed forces may run counter-operations that undermine the goal of the policies set by the executive. In Indonesia, the armed forces formally endorsed the decision by the Habibie government to hold a referendum in East Timor, but immediately began to support the build-up of pro-integration militias assigned with sabotaging the process. In addition to the control of defence and security policies, militaries often demand legal jurisdiction over their own personnel. In post-authoritarian states, the armed forces may insist on the autonomy of their legal systems in order to fend off demands for legal inquiries into crimes and violations that occurred under the previous regime. While such investigations are often essential for the success of democratic transitions, civilian authorities may find it necessary to reach compromises with the military, resulting in *de facto* amnesties for incriminated officers. The ability of militaries to sabotage and obstruct the implementation of government directives in other policy fields is the major consideration behind such compromises. Once again, Indonesia has had significant difficulties in this area during the transition.

The fourth area that militaries traditionally attempt to participate in or establish control over is the socio-cultural sector. Civil society and its socio-cultural expressions, including the media, are important elements in stabilizing or undermining political structures, and their control and manipulation is a major component of regime maintenance in authoritarian states. Not only does military surveillance of cultural activities dampen criticism of the regime, but the armed forces may also initiate or support religious events, literary works, ideological indoctrination courses, theatre plays, media features, or concerts aiming to influence public opinion on policy issues in general or the role of the military in particular. The socio-cultural sector is in fact the most difficult to establish definite control over, and the decline of authoritarian regimes often begins with subtle manoeuvres by protagonists of cultural life to voice the very opposition towards the government that formal institutions were unable to express. Intellectuals, writers, artists, and musicians have often had a larger impact on the fate of regimes than politicians, either in destabilizing or legitimizing them (Bodden 1999, pp. 155–56). The interaction of the armed forces with civil society and the cultural sphere is often overlooked in studies on civil-military relations, with the main focus remaining on state institutions and military participation in them. The widened concept of democratic control of the armed forces,

however, acknowledges the importance of non-political actors in the civil-military equation, and looks critically at how socio-cultural factors either catalyze democratic consolidation, or on the contrary, help the armed forces in preserving their privileges.

## TYPOLOGICAL MODELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

After having identified the areas in which military intervention occurs, it is important to describe the various typological models that have dominated the discourse on civil-military relations in authoritarian states so far.<sup>6</sup> Although these models are less precise in analysing civil-military dynamics in transitional states, they are helpful in picturing the level of military intervention a particular state had to overcome when the democratic transition began.

The most extreme form of military intervention in politics has been termed as “praetorian” rule. In praetorian models of governance, the military is the main component of the regime, and all other forces and institutions are under its control. Executive, legislature, and judiciary are either directly occupied by members of the armed forces or by loyalist civilians. Praetorian regimes often rule under emergency regulations or legislation passed under their supervision. Many of the Latin American and African states that were the focus of the classic studies on military interventionism in the 1950s were countries under praetorian rule. In the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea and Bangladesh had praetorian regimes, and Burma still falls under this category today. A second model is that of “participant-ruler”, describing countries with direct military participation in, but not full control of, government bodies. The armed forces may form alliances with or serve the interests of a particular civilian elite, and receive government participation and control over security policies in return. The Philippines under Marcos, Thailand for much of the 1980s, and the majority of communist states were examples of this type of state-military relations. Communist leaders in particular may have calculated that the inclusion of the military in governance would not only bind the armed forces to the ruling elite and neutralize the potential for opposition, but also transform the military into one of the main pillars of the regime.

In the model of “guardian” rule, on the other hand, militaries do not necessarily have to participate in or dominate the government. They have enough institutional powers to judge the performance of civilian governments

and remove them if deemed necessary. Such militaries define themselves as protectors of national values and goals, whether it is to preserve the territorial integrity of the state or the adherence to a specific national ideology. Turkey has been a classic example of the guardian model, with the military now staying out of most government institutions, but still powerful enough to successfully challenge any government viewed as violating the principles of secularism or not doing enough to contain the Kurdish threat to Turkey's borders.<sup>7</sup> In contrast to this, the "referee" model describes the role of militaries in countries with high levels of political competition, where the armed forces act as "king-makers". The backing by the military may decide the power struggle in favour of a certain group, and the top brass will receive concessions for its support. Such concessions can take the form of regime participation or other privileges serving the military's interests. Of particular importance in this model are the non-political powers possessed by militaries, whether based on coercion or collective acknowledgement by civilian forces. The notion of the military as a "referee" suggests, however, that the armed forces are a neutral mediator in political conflict, which is rarely the case. Huntington therefore introduced the concept of a "praetorian society", in which no single force is able to exercise full authority, including the military.

Most countries with long histories of military intervention have found themselves changing from one model into another at various stages of their development. Arguably, Indonesia went through all four paradigms since the 1950s. The role of the armed forces under parliamentary democracy conforms to the guardian model as the military helped to terminate the democratic system amidst threats to Indonesia's territorial integrity. During the Sukarno regime of 1959–65, the armed forces were participant-rulers, sharing power with the president and confronting the rising influence of the communists. The army intervened in 1965, establishing a praetorian regime with military control of all state institutions. By the early 1990s, however, the increasing stake of civilian elements in the New Order reduced the military's role in state institutions again to that of a participant-ruler. The armed forces were increasingly critical of the more sultanistic aspects of the president's rule,<sup>8</sup> but withdrew their support only after a public uprising had cornered him. The "referee model", finally, is able to describe some phenomena of the early post-Suharto transition. Especially in the 1999–2001 period, the armed forces were able to position themselves as a power broker between the competing civilian forces, gaining substantial concessions in return. The model is less suitable, however, to grasp the dynamics of later stages of the transitional process. It is difficult to argue, for example, that the military today still has the power to engineer the appointment of

governments and influence key policies, particularly since Yudhoyono's direct election in 2004 and the subsequent resolution of the Aceh conflict. While no longer possessing "veto powers", however, the armed forces have been able to cling on to several of their institutional privileges, including *de facto* legal impunity from legal investigations, the territorial command structure, and the system of military self-financing. Evidently, the existing models for military intervention are poorly equipped to explain these dynamics of post-authoritarian transitions.

### ANALYTICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

The various models of military intervention in politics have been linked to different sets of explanations. The question why some militaries intervene in politics and others do not, and which factors influence the level of intervention, has been the focus of numerous case studies and theoretical discourses. Three approaches stand out as the most prominent ones, and they are discussed shortly in this section: first, the classic Huntingtonian notion of professional militaries versus non-professional ones; second, the reference to internal and external threats as a major determinant of military engagement; and third, the linkage between the functionality and legitimacy of civilian institutions on the one hand and the intensity of military involvement on the other.

The proposition of a nexus between military professionalism and the involvement of the armed forces in politics has been challenged by new theories and contradicting evidence, but it remains a prominent school of thought in the study of civil-military relations. Huntington asserted that a professional military is certain to maintain its neutrality and isolate itself from the temptations of political interference. Militaries that concentrate on the development of technical expertise and the fulfilment of their institutional responsibilities, said Huntington (1957), are very likely to obey policy decisions made by civilian authorities. Professional militaries allow for what Huntington (1957, p. 121) calls "objective civilian control", a concept that in its substance comes close to what has been introduced above as "democratic control" of the armed forces, but lacks its procedural understanding. Unprofessional militaries, i.e. those that do not focus on skills development, technological innovations, and improvement of strategic thinking, are prone to become interested in practical politics. David Shambaugh (2002, p. 13), commenting on the reform process of the Chinese PLA (People's Liberation Army), used Huntington's theory to describe the depoliticization of the PLA in the second half of the 1990s:

Senior PLA officers ... are now promoted based on meritocratic and professional criteria, while political consciousness and activism account for little. The officer corps is thus becoming increasingly professional, in classic Huntingtonian terms.... The military's mission today is almost exclusively external, to protect national security, rather than internal security. The role of ideology is virtually nil, and political work has declined substantially....

Huntington's model continues to be influential in the field of foreign military assistance to countries in transition, where many donors believe that professionalization of the armed forces is a precondition for establishing democratic control. Accordingly, large parts of the available funds are being allocated for training officers in classic military courses, with the expectation that this may instil sufficient levels of interest in their military profession and, at the same time, reduce their desire to intervene in politics.

The problem with Huntington's assertion lies, of course, in its definition of "professionalism". The concept of "professionalism" does not exclude the possibility that militaries acquire professional skills that may encourage intervention in politics. Stepan's notion of a "new professionalism" captures this possibility, and identifies internal security and national development as the two areas in which militaries have increased their professional skills, driving them into the political arena (Stepan 1986; Danopoulos 2002). Stepan argued that the expansion of military professionalism into areas of non-military expertise, such as economic management and community development, has increased the dependence of civilians on the advice of the armed forces in various fields of governance. In addition, a series of case studies has also questioned Huntington's findings. In his study on the armed forces of Pakistan, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002, p. 157) maintained that the military "played a very important role in the Pakistani polity and no significant decision was taken, in domestic or security affairs, without the military's input". Yet he also concluded that the armed forces are "disciplined and well-trained" (Cheema 2002, p. xiii). Military professionalism in praetorian states? The majority of academic research suggests that such cases exist, casting doubt on the very linkage between professionalism and levels of military intervention that forms the essence of Huntington's model.

Besides the issue of professionalism, the discussion on the causes of military intervention in politics has concentrated on internal and external threat levels in particular states. While there is agreement that high levels of internal threat (political conflict, social inequalities, ethnic rivalries, separatism,

lawlessness) lead to increased political intervention of the armed forces, the literature remains divided on the consequences of high levels of external threat (wars, international terrorism, piracy). Some, like the proponents of the “garrison state”, have argued that the constant threat of war may lead to the institutionalization of the military’s role in politics (Lasswell 1941). Others, such as Andreski (1954), have maintained exactly the opposite. They have explained that external threats keep militaries occupied and, therefore, out of politics. Hunter (1996), writing on civil-military relations in Latin America, even asserted that deepening the engagement of post-authoritarian militaries in external defence cooperation helped to reduce their political ambitions. Further developing this argument, Michael Desch (1999) introduced a model that analyses the interplay between external and internal threats on the one hand and the quality of “civilian” control of the military on the other. He suggested that high levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat result in “stronger” civilian control; high levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat lead to “poor” civilian control; low levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat produce the “worst” civilian control; and low levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat are likely to see “mixed” civilian control. Desch’s theory, particularly its proposition that low levels of internal conflict produce stronger civilian control, will be significant for the discussion of Indonesia’s civil-military relations after the successful implementation of the Aceh peace agreement in 2005.

Theories that link the levels of internal and external threat with the extent of military intervention in politics are of significant descriptive value, but they have one crucial analytical weakness. They tend to view levels of threat as objective facts, established by scientific means and under conditions of political neutrality. The reality is, of course, quite different. There is sufficient evidence that militaries have not only created public perceptions of threat levels that consolidated their political positions, but have also actively engineered conflict situations that increased the levels of threat, both internally and externally. Threat levels are part of the political discourse within societies, and their interpretations are therefore informed by the vested interests of particular groups and institutions (Mares 1998, p. 9). Militaries may give their assessments of threat levels not only based on objective facts, but also from the perspective of how such an analysis can generate additional funding and other institutional privileges for the armed forces. In the same context, militaries may stimulate, create, or prolong conflicts, particularly in the domestic arena, if such acts of manipulation are deemed favourable to their interests. In Indonesia, many observers have argued that while the

secessionist movements in Aceh (before 2005) and Papua have constituted serious threats to the state, their operations have been partly encouraged by elements of the military in order to highlight its indispensability as the guardian of national unity. This problem of manipulability exposes threat level theories to another analytical question: what has made militaries in a small number of states so powerful that they can control the public perception of threat levels, and even create conflict situations to increase them? With this, the threat level theories may arrive back at the very question that they claimed to answer.

A third school of thought has highlighted the quality of civilian state institutions as an important factor in determining the extent of military involvement in politics. *Finer* (2003, pp. 86–89) laid the grounds for this model by asserting that countries with a “developed political culture” are more likely to see strong civilian control over the military than those with low levels of societal respect for the governmental and legal institutions of the state.<sup>9</sup> Militaries tend to seek political participation, and ultimately control, if state institutions lack the legitimacy and functional strength to run effective and stable administrations. In this view, the failure of civilian governments to maintain political stability, manage security threats, deliver economic growth, and uphold law and order has “forced” militaries to intervene. However, *Finer’s* argument carries the risk of being tautological: military non-intervention does not only result from a developed political culture, it is in fact one of the preconditions for the latter to emerge in the first place. The importance of *Finer’s* theory, therefore, is less based on its explanatory strength than its ability to shift the analytical emphasis from the military-focused professionalism and threat-level theories to the discussion of political culture. For *Finer*, the key to understanding the reasons for involvement of the armed forces in politics lies as much in society as in the institutional interests of the military.

In this context, several authors have looked at levels of economic development as indicators for the likelihood of military intervention.<sup>10</sup> Proponents of development-based theories have argued that higher levels of economic development produce new political actors with increased demands for participation in state institutions, challenging traditional players such as the bureaucratic elite, large business corporations, and the military. For example, the emergence of a new middle class in Asia in the late 1980s has been credited with the removal of the military from power in South Korea and Thailand. There, economically inspired demands for free markets, eradication of corruption, abolition of monopolies, and the impartiality of the legal system formed the conceptual core of the oppositional movements.

As one observer of Thai politics noted, the 1992 uprising was “not so much pro-democracy, as it is often claimed, but rather a movement opposed to the possibility of a new alliance of the military and business leading to a dictatorship” (Samudavanija 1997, p. 63). There are more complex examples, however. The military in Indonesia did not only survive three decades of economic growth without major challenges to its privileged position, but has drawn its political legitimacy from it. It was precisely when the economic boom ended, and the new middle class was thrown into crisis, that the armed forces had to accept Suharto’s departure and the subsequent democratic reforms. It appears, therefore, that it is not always economic development as such that erodes military interference in politics. Rather, it is often a sudden downturn after long periods of growth that increases the likelihood of opposition by the middle class to the very authoritarian rulers that facilitated its rise.

The theories that focus on society, the economy, and institutions of the state as key indicators for military interventions in politics have considerable advantages over the models based on military professionalism and the various levels of threat. They establish an important (and so far missing) link between the quality of governance as a whole and the political intervention opportunities of militaries, and analyse the issue of civil-military relations in the wider institutional framework of the state. Substantial weaknesses remain, however. To begin with, the issue of weak civilian institutions cannot be debated in a political vacuum. Militaries may have the power to weaken institutions of the state in order to prepare their own rise to power. This is particularly relevant for countries in which political institutions are in an early stage of their development and thus vulnerable to outside interference. Daniel Lev (1994, p. 39), for example, has argued that the disintegration of Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s was the result of political manoeuvring by the army: “Why? In part because it could, but also because it had compelling interests in a quite different political system.” Conceptually, the identification of weak civilian institutions as a factor in motivating military intervention in politics raises new questions related to the causes for such weaknesses, and the institutional interests of the military may well be part of the answer. A second problem is the omission of international factors. The shifts in policy priorities after the Cold War, the role of international donors, and the increased importance of human rights since the 1990s have, however limited in scale, influenced the political aspirations of militaries in developing states. While insufficient to form a theoretical model on their own, arguments centring around international factors have to be taken into account when explaining the

elements that facilitate political involvement of militaries or force them to disengage.

### THE FALL OF MILITARY REGIMES: FACTORS AND CONTEXTS

The discussion of the causes of political interference by militaries leads into the debate about their “extrusion” (i.e., their departure) from politics. Consequently, this section will examine the reasons for the disintegration of military-backed or military-dominated regimes, and build analytical bridges to the study of civil-military relations in transitional states.

Some of the theories developed to explain the downfall of military regimes deal specifically with the unsustainable aspects of military rule, while others propose more general explanations for the end of authoritarian governments. The notion of an inherent non-sustainability of military rule has traditionally been based on the inability of the armed forces to explain their political engagement beyond the short-term legitimacy of emergency intervention (Alagappa 2001*b*, pp. 50–51). Militaries tend to intervene in times of political and economic crisis, claiming that civilian authorities have failed to protect the interests of the state. Such an intervention may be popular for as long as the emergency persists, but becomes problematic once stability is restored and the role of the military is institutionalized. Some militaries can argue that their institutional engagement is necessary to prevent the reoccurrence of the very emergency situation that provoked it to intervene, but such situational frameworks of legitimacy are unlikely to sustain military rule for a longer period of time. Accordingly, some militaries have expanded their basis of legitimacy to include national development, the defence of particular ideologies or, more generally, the maintenance of national unity. The link between military legitimacy and the achievement of certain goals, however, has thrown the armed forces into what Huntington called a “performance dilemma”. If they fail to achieve their self-set targets, societies are likely to seek a quick end to military rule; if, on the other hand, the goals are achieved, the reasons for continued military intervention may be questioned as well. Sustained economic growth, the unchallenged dominance of a particular ideology, or the permanent neutralization of threats to national unity remove not only the emergency context under which militaries came to power, but also erode their claim to institutionalized rule. Theories of disintegrating military regimes have therefore concentrated on the linear process of emergency intervention, expansion of legitimacy claims, and subsequent erosion of the regime by either performance failures or, on

the contrary, the long-term consequences of its successes. This erosion can facilitate a change of regime, and in some cases initiate post-authoritarian transition.

One important factor in limiting the lifespan of military regimes is the growing distance between those officers who staged the initial emergency intervention and assumed executive powers of government, and those who are in charge of the day-to-day management of the armed forces. In addition to these two major factions, Stepan (1988, p. 30) emphasized the importance of military intelligence operators, or the “security community”, as a third group with specific interests. Military leaders in positions of political power may, like Indonesia’s Suharto, try to create factionalism within the armed forces in order to prevent a challenge to their rule. These efforts of weakening potential rivals for political power are closely related to the issue of succession (Brooks 1998, p. 20). Only very few military regimes have seen non-violent changes in leadership, with coups and internal elimination of competitors the most common way of transferring governmental authority. The ouster and arrest of Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in October 2004, for example, illustrated the non-institutional character of succession in military-dominated states. Similarly, Thailand has seen a series of coups within its military regimes between the 1930s and the early 1990s, and rumours of a counter-coup from within the armed forces also circulated widely after their most recent overthrow of a civilian government in September 2006. It was partly this prospect of being violently deposed and persecuted that has discouraged military-backed rulers like Suharto from addressing the issue of succession at all. Instead, they tended to postpone the topic for so long that society began to turn not only against them, but against the system of military-based governance itself.

While there are some military-specific aspects in the downfall of regimes controlled or backed by the armed forces, most of the factors that lead to the erosion of such polities can be applied to other forms of authoritarian rule as well. Alagappa (2001*b*, p. 53) divided the possible explanations for the breakdown of authoritarian governments “into two categories: international factors (war, conquest, changes in the global material and normative structure, changes in the global economy, changes in the foreign policy of major powers), and domestic factors (economic crisis, loss of legitimacy, conflict within the ruling bloc, growing public opposition, civil war, internal conflict)”. Apart from very obvious cases where regimes are overthrown by external military intervention (such as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein from power), there

seem to be very few cases in which international factors played the lead role in bringing authoritarian reigns to an end.<sup>11</sup> International economic crises, multinational alliances, and development aid may, in fact, stimulate and sustain authoritarian interventions as much as they can help remove autocratic regimes. The role of international donors in the Indonesian crisis of 1998 is a case in point: while the credits extended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had the potential of saving Suharto's rule, it was the president's mishandling of the aid package that fuelled opposition to the continuation of his government. It appears, therefore, that the major causes of the disintegration of authoritarian regimes lie in the domestic area. Regimes become vulnerable if they are no longer able to serve the interests of the societal groups that originally benefited from authoritarian rule, triggering a series of phenomena that ultimately cause the regime to fall: internal splits within the elite, the revitalization of opposition groups through new power configurations, societal protest against the inefficiency of government, and conflicts within the military. While all these developments take place within an international context, and may well be influenced by it, they follow the inherently domestic logic of the contested regime and the opposing forces it has produced.

As demonstrated in the course of this introduction, the literature on civil-military relations has been expansive on the areas in which militaries seek intervention; on the various models of military participation in politics; on the reasons that cause some militaries to intervene and others to stay disengaged; and, finally, on the explanations for the downfall of military regimes. Among the presented theoretical approaches and models, however, there were very few that could capture the dynamics of the role militaries play in post-authoritarian states. The classic categorizations of military intervention (praetorian, participant-ruler, guardian, referee) have proven too general to describe the complexity of civil-military interactions in transitional states, and the various reasons linked to them (lack of professionalism, internal and external threat levels, quality of state institutions) are limited in their scope and explanatory power. The theories on the fall of military regimes, on the other hand, do not extend to the residual powers the armed forces may use in post-authoritarian transitions, or the way they may assimilate to new democratic frameworks. According to Robin Luckham (2003, p. 11), the fluid contexts of political transitions have created "new problems for analysis, including how to decipher underlying shifts in military power relations when these are no longer flagged by open military intervention". The following section will, therefore, look at the very limited number of studies that have attempted to describe the nuances of civil-military relations

in transitional states, and will then discuss a recently developed model that may be of help to investigate the subject of this study, the civil-military relations in post-Suharto Indonesia.

## MILITARIES IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

Most of the recent case studies on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states have used classic models in order to explain the complexities of new contexts. This leads to problems in connecting the theoretical model with the empirical material, and may even result in inconsistencies between the model-based argument and narrative-based conclusion. Herbert C. Huser's study on civil-military relations in Argentina, for example, uses the Finerian model of "political culture" to explain the military's exit from politics after 1983. Using Finer's notion of legitimacy as the major element of a developed political culture, Huser (2002, p. 23) maintained that

Argentine politics may be characterized as different sources of legitimacy being advanced, simultaneously and exclusively, by groups in contest. In other words, democracy is not a given in the political culture, and a single rule of legitimacy does not apply; fragmented legitimacy and conflicts are apparent.

In Finer's model, such a diversity of competing legitimacies, reflected in a lack of respect for the existing institutions, would lead to increased levels of military intervention. Yet Huser (2002, p. 196) concluded that "the historical role of the military as an autonomous political contender appears to have run its course, as have the contests between the military and the civilian government for legitimate political authority". Apparently, the evolution of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Argentina was much more complex than Finer's model would suggest; Huser described the persistence of important differences between the civilian forces over the legitimacy of the political framework, but at the same time reported substantial progress in depoliticizing the armed forces. This disconnect between theoretical assumption and the presented material points to the ineffectiveness of classic models in capturing the nuances of developments in transitional states.

Other authors have approached the problem of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states in a very normative way. They identify democratic control of the armed forces as a substantial element of successful democratic transitions, and describe the conditions countries have to fulfil to achieve this

goal (Fitch 2001, pp. 61–63). These conditions read like the reversed catalogue of the reasons classically given for military intervention: empowerment of civilian institutions of the state, reducing the use of coercion in managing political conflicts, installing democratic paradigms into the mindset of the officer corps, professionalization of the armed forces and their concentration on external defence matters, restructuring of the security sector, and isolation of the old top brass from the political process. There is some disagreement about the importance of reform initiatives taken in the early phase of the transition. O'Donnell and Schmitter have argued that the process of reforming the military is a generational project, and that initial institutional changes may have only limited impact. Aguero (1995, p. 39), on the other hand, has asserted that “the initial conditions are critical in shaping the first transition outcome”. Among others, he named civilian control over the reform agenda as a crucial element of the transitional process. The widely held view that democratic transitions in general and establishment of democratic control of the armed forces in particular are long-term developments likely to proceed for decades, has discouraged most observers from analysing the early period of the transition in much detail. This study will argue that many of Aguero’s “initial conditions” are determined by the character of the regime change from authoritarian rule to the new government, as well as by developments in the early days of the democratic era when the political landscape takes shape. This focus will help to identify the extent to which the normative conditions for initiating democratic control of the armed forces were addressed at an early stage, and where delays and omissions have caused serious problems in later phases of the transition.

Besides the concentration on classic models and the proposition of normative conditions, another prominent approach has been the analysis of transitions as interplays of competing political and economic interests. Such a model, which authors such as David Pion-Berlin (2001, p. 18) have called a theory of “strategic action”, allows for a high extent of analytical flexibility, and calls for case studies to explain the specific situations of particular countries. The downside of this approach is, of course, that it is largely self-evident. There is little doubt that the scale and the outcome of the competition between interest groups over political privileges and economic resources have a major impact on transitional processes, including on the evolution of post-authoritarian civil-military relations. The strength of this model, therefore, lies more in its ability to concentrate its analytical focus on what it views as the primary source of conflict in transitions and draw attention away from secondary factors such as conflicting value systems and long-term

structural change. With its emphasis on politico-economic conflicts between key actors, the interest-based approach is less an explanatory theory than a methodological guideline for the description of particular transitions.

It is interesting to note that even proponents of structuralist explanations of democratic transition, while rejecting the interest-based model as narrow and ignorant of global dynamics of change, tend to describe the conflicts in transitional states as power struggles between old elites and new political forces, between “predatory” and “neo-liberal” interests. Richard Robison (2002, p. 95), for example, criticized the interest-based approach as the product of “rational choice theorists” who explain democratic transitions as processes “driven by the rational calculations of rising and declining elites facing rising costs of suppressing opponents and forced to seek a new political format that, while second best, is preferable to mutual destruction”. His own analysis of the Indonesian transition, however, describes the post-1998 events as “the struggle to shape the institutions that define the new democracy”, involving “alliances and coalitions of state power and social interest” connected to the Suharto regime on the one hand and the “reformist camp” on the other (Robison 2002, p. 93). While contextualised in a framework of capitalist expansion, it appears that even structuralist approaches like Robison’s rely heavily on the analysis of competing interest groups to make their case.

The multitude of theoretical approaches introduced so far has indicated that particular aspects of some models may be helpful in capturing the dynamics of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states. Several authors have tried, therefore, to combine the various theories into a single model that can address the specific conditions of democratic transitions, and explain why some civil-military reform projects succeed while others run into serious obstacles. Alagappa (2001*b*, p. 29), for example, has amalgamated the most influential writings on civil-military relations into one inclusive “analytical framework”. The downside of such eclectic models is their vagueness and generality. Forced into a united theoretical approach, most of its components lose their sharp analytical edge and explanatory power. Accordingly, the following section discusses one model that tries to integrate diverse aspects of the existing civil-military literature without insisting on their analytical combination. Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, writing comparatively on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, have designed a model that appears to be well equipped to explain the fluid state of civil-military relations in post-Suharto Indonesia.

## CRITIQUE: THE TWO-GENERATION MODEL

The model developed by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster integrates normative and empirical elements into one comprehensive framework of gradually evolving civil-military relations in transitional states. They recognize the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces as a crucial component of democratic consolidation, and assert that the academic discourse on such issues has been misguided by its narrow focus on the circumstances, traditions, and histories of Western states (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2001, p. 2). Traditional theories of civil-military relations developed in the West have often stressed the likelihood of the armed forces seizing political power, instead of explaining the wide spectrum of intervention levels between the extremes of democratic control and praetorian rule. Not only have most Western models proven ineffective in capturing the dynamics of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian contexts, they have already moved on to paradigms of a “post-modern military”. Analysts such as Charles Moskos have characterized the post-modern military by its increasing “interpenetrability” between civilian and military spheres; its internal modernization in terms of gender equality and acceptance of different sexual orientations; its involvement in non-traditional operations such as peacekeeping; and its integration into supra- or multinational command structures (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000, pp. 6–9). Obviously, such models have little relevance for transitional states struggling to build workable institutions of governance and reduce military intervention in politics. Cottey et al. tried to address the ineffectiveness of both traditional theories and post-modern models by developing an approach that fits the political circumstances of post-authoritarian transitions, and also allows for sufficient levels of analytical flexibility to establish differences between particular countries.

The explanatory focus of the model is directed towards security sector governance, a process of multi-level interactions through which democratic control of the armed forces is exercised. This approach investigates the relationship between state institutions (executive, legislature, bureaucracy), the security forces (armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, state-legitimized armed formations), and civil society — defined by Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 7–8) as the arena in which “self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests”. The quality of this relationship determines whether countries are successful in their attempts to establish democratic control over the armed forces, or whether

problematic civil-military interactions become obstacles to further democratic consolidation. Specific indicators are the extent to which the democratically legitimized executive is able to formulate and implement policy decisions on foreign relations, the deployment and use of force, and defence management; the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; and the involvement of civil society groups with expertise in defence and security affairs (which make up what Cottey et al. call the “non-governmental security community”) in the formulation of defence policy.

The most significant contribution of the Cottey et al. model to the debate on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states is the introduction of a two-generation model of reform phases in democratic transitions. According to Cottey et al., most countries that have initiated democratic reform after long periods of military-backed, authoritarian rule begin the transitional process with changes to their institutional framework: abolition of security institutions associated with the old regime, establishment of new civilian bodies to control the armed forces, changes to the command system, and empowerment of parliament. This first phase of institutional measures is what Cottey et al. (2001, p. 5) called the “first generation” of civil-military reforms. The first generation of reforms is important for the dismantling of old power structures as well as for the definition of what the end goal of the democratic transition should be. It is insufficient, however, to address capacity problems of the newly created institutions, and to control residual powers the armed forces may be able to exercise through non-institutional political networks (Betz 2003, p. 2). Political institutions, as well as civil society groups, can only function properly if they have the capacity to fulfil their tasks. Lack of expertise, experience, funds, infrastructure, supporting staff, technology, and information can cause even highly sophisticated institutional frameworks to collapse or simply become dysfunctional.

Accordingly, the “second generation” of reforms is crucial. The second generation consolidates the frameworks created in the first; it provides the democratic substance to the structures established by laws and political decisions. The challenge of the second-generation reforms is centred around building capacity of both state institutions and civil society, and it concerns three main areas: first, the “development of working mechanisms for the implementation and oversight of defence policy”. Second, the establishment of “effective systems of security sector governance, which allows a country’s defence and security requirements to be adequately assessed, reassessed, and addressed”. And third, “the engagement of ‘civil society’ as a core component of oversight and accountability in defence and security matters” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2001, p. 5).

Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster used their two-generation model to evaluate processes of civil-military reform in numerous states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, most of which had highly politicized armed forces during decades of communist rule. Their assessment of the reform processes concludes that despite strong traditions of military praetorianism in most of the investigated countries, and despite the chaos of post-communist transition, none of the states has seen the recurrence of military rule. However, the experiences of the researched states with their military reform projects have been highly diverse, ranging from considerable successes to failure to launch reform initiatives at all. Cottey et al. have developed four categories of countries, each defining the position of a particular state on the two-generation scale of civil-military reforms.<sup>12</sup> The first group consists of states that have largely addressed the first-generation agenda, but in some cases have experienced problems in implementing second-generation reforms. In their research, Cottey et al. have identified eleven states that belong to this group, among them Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The second type is characterized by countries that have faced persistent problems with the first-generation agenda, although some civil-military reforms have been initiated. This group contains two countries: Russia and the Ukraine. The third group of countries is made up of states that have not even seen first-generation measures of reforms. There are seven countries in this group, including Turkmenistan and Belarus. The fourth category, finally, describes states that have initiated both first and second-generation reform steps but were too weak to sustain them, leading to either stagnation or collapse of the reform process. This group consists of seven states, among them Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan.

In order to explain why some countries have progressed further than others in the process of civil-military reforms, Cottey et al. (2002, pp. 10–14) have developed five explanatory propositions: first, the historical legacy of military engagement in politics under previous regimes can influence the pace and scope of military reform in post-authoritarian transitions. While transitions are not predetermined by historical contexts of the preceding regime, the persistence of its power structures may play an important role in the emerging democratic polity. Second, the state of civil-military relations is a reflection of the democratization process as a whole. Countries in which alternatives to liberal democracy have largely been delegitimized have seen more significant moves towards establishing democratic control over the armed forces than states in which the principles of political organization are still contested. Third, international incentives have had a major impact on the willingness of states to pursue civil-military reforms. The majority of

Central and Eastern European countries have established democratic control over their armed forces as a precondition for acceptance into NATO and the European Union. The economic and political advantages offered by membership in these multinational associations have even convinced the more conservative militaries in the region to comply with the normative standards of the organizations they sought to enter. Fourth, the depth of domestic institutional reform in the security sector can be an important factor for the state of civil-military relations. Consolidated institutional reforms “reduce the vulnerability of civil-military relations towards the vagaries of domestic political change” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2000, p. 3), while artificially implemented reforms are unlikely to be sustainable over longer periods of time. Fifth, specific “military cultures” can support or obstruct the efforts of establishing democratic control. In this regard, the level of professionalism (understood as “the extent to which the military view their core mission as to undertake in a professional manner the military tasks defined for them by civilian political leaders”)<sup>13</sup> is of crucial importance.

The Cottey et al. model leads to important insights regarding the case of Indonesia. To begin with, it delivers an explanatory framework for the preliminary analysis that despite a series of institutional reforms, Indonesia’s armed forces have retained considerable privileges that have made it difficult for the state to establish effective democratic control. The model suggests that Indonesia has experienced serious difficulties in completing the first-generation reforms and/or initiating second-generation measures. The two-generation categorization allows for a much more precise identification of Indonesia’s place in the comparative scale of countries with transitional civil-military relations than the traditional models of praetorian, participant-ruler, guardian, and referee levels of military intervention. In addition, it also points to the wider context of democratization in Indonesia, and requires the study of the correlation between institutional military reform and the political discourse on competing models of governance. Such a focus may help to discover the extent to which political disputes between major political forces have obstructed the process of institutional military reform and, therefore, delayed its second-generation consolidation. Furthermore, the model highlights the absence of international affiliations and alliances that could have forced Indonesia to pursue military reforms faster and with more depth. Finally, the emphasis on institutional reform questions the degree to which the structures of Indonesia’s security sector were reformed after 1998. In this context, the persistence of the entrenched territorial command structure suggests that the process of institutional reform remains incomplete.

Despite its explanatory advantages over other models of civil-military relations, the Cottey et al. approach shares one fundamental weakness with most of its counterparts: it says very little about the factors that obstruct the empowerment of civilians to control the security sector. Cottey et al. tended to focus on the lack of technical expertise and infrastructure, and pay only secondary attention to the dynamics of post-authoritarian power struggles among civilian forces. In a rather cursory manner, they concede that there is significant “willingness of some civilian elites to try and draw the armed forces (or elements of the armed forces) into politics in order to gain their support in what are primarily civilian, domestic political conflicts” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2001, p. 4). This is an important assessment, and deserves further analysis. In his study on the Nigerian military, ‘Emeka Nwagwu (2002, p. 73) focused on tribalism and regional conflicts as the main reasons for military intervention in African politics. Similarly, Indonesia’s social, religious, and political landscape is a complicated web of long-standing alliances and rivalries, with the conflict over the role of Islam in politics standing out as one of the primary sources of tension in the civilian sphere. In fact, the impact of inter-civilian disputes on the pace and quality of civil-military reforms appears to be one of the most important explanatory components of the two-generation model, and should have been integrated into the catalogue of causes for successful, failed, or stalled transitions. Accordingly, while the Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster model covers a wide range of analytical indicators and explanatory propositions, it provides ample opportunities for improvements, additions, and alterations. The aim of this book is, therefore, not only to test existing models in the context of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Indonesia, but also to expand such theories with the lessons learnt from the Indonesian case. This expectation is reflected in the structure of the book.

## THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

As indicated earlier, the review of the scholarly literature on civil-military relations has led to important insights that consequently determined the structure of this book. First and foremost, the discussion above demonstrated that neither Huntington’s focus on military professionalism nor Finer’s emphasis on political culture and the quality of civilian governance are — as isolated analytical approaches — sufficient to explain the extent to which militaries engage in political affairs. In order to present a full picture of civil-military relations in transitional states, the analysis must take account of internal developments in the military *and* in civilian politics. Accordingly, this

book divides its attention equally between military affairs and the dynamics within civilian groups, presenting parallel chapters that allow for in-depth analysis of both fields. In terms of civilian politics, this book stresses the impact of conflicts between key civilian constituencies on intervention opportunities of the armed forces in political affairs. It will show that whenever the level of intra-civilian conflict was high, democratic oversight the armed forces was weak. By contrast, when tensions between civilian groups declined, as they did in Indonesia after 2004, the quality of democratic control improved. In this context, I chose the controversy within the Muslim community over the role of Islam in political life as a case study to highlight general patterns of intra-civilian conflict in Indonesia. Historically, Muslims with secular-nationalist attitudes have been engaged in heated debates with more devout followers of the faith over the relationship between the state and religious affairs. Equally important, however, are divisions within the community of devout Muslims itself, with modernist and traditionalist groups split over doctrinal, social, and political aspects of their religion. These conflicts have stretched from the colonial period over parliamentary democracy and two authoritarian regimes to the current phase of democratic consolidation, making them suitable for a long-term study on the correlation between levels of civilian fragmentation and military engagement in politics.<sup>14</sup>

The second important conclusion drawn from the discussion of the existing scholarly literature for the structure of this book relates to the fluctuation in the quality of democratic control of the armed forces. If the effectiveness of oversight depends on the level of intra-civilian conflict and the overall stability of the civilian polity, we should expect significant variations in different phases of the transition. Indeed, Indonesia has seen highly diverse trends in civil-military relations under Presidents Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono, reflecting both their individual approaches to the military and different dynamics in civilian affairs. Thus in order to identify events and developments that caused these fluctuations in the process of military reform, a chronological approach is imperative. Based on this insight, the book is chronologically structured in four parts, with parallel chapters on military and Muslim affairs covering different periods in Indonesia's modern political history. Closely related to this, the academic discourse on civil-military relations in transitional states has pointed to the importance of historical legacies for the course of military reform under post-authoritarian rule. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster asserted that in countries where military ideologies and power structures were imposed by historical coincidences and/or external force, their disintegration was fast and complete. The armed forces in such states found it easy to support post-authoritarian polities as

their identification with the deposed power-holders was artificial. If, on the other hand, military dominance of political institutions was deeply entrenched in society, transitional processes were much more problematic. For that reason, the first part of this book discusses the historical legacies of military involvement in Indonesian politics and, parallel to that, the divisions within the civilian sphere that helped to sustain it.

The last key conclusion from the theoretical discussion that informed the structuring of this book is concerned with the impact of the character of regime change on transition outcomes. Agüero's emphasis on the "initial conditions" suggests that the analysis of events that marked the transfer of power from the *ancien régime* to the post-authoritarian polity is essential for the understanding of civil-military transitions. The second part of this book is therefore devoted to the discussion of the 1998 regime change in Indonesia. It shows that the roles played by the armed forces and key civilian groups during the political crisis of 1997 and 1998 assisted elements of the New Order to extend their influence into the post-authoritarian era and obstruct efforts for wider institutional reform in the early period of the transition. The chapters on historical legacies and the character of regime change subsequently provide the analytical and empirical background for the explanation of civil-military developments in the post-Suharto transition, which are covered in the third and fourth part of the book.

In summary, the four parts of the book, which comprise two chapters each, combine a historical approach with contemporary political analysis. The first part focuses on historical legacies that have had a profound impact on the state of Indonesian civil-military relations. Chapter 1 discusses the history of military politics, the structural entrenchment of the armed forces in society, and ideological developments within the officer corps. Chapter 2, for its part, highlights the divisions within Indonesia's Muslim community as one of the primary sources of conflict in the civilian political sphere. The chapter explains the religious, social, and political gap between secular-nationalist and devout Muslims on the one hand, and the conflicts between traditionalist and modernist Islam on the other. The second part of the study describes the regime change of 1998 and its repercussions for the civil-military transition after Suharto's fall. Chapter 3 argues that moderate elements in the armed forces helped to negotiate an intra-systemic transfer of power from Suharto to his deputy, avoiding a more radical break with the authoritarian past. The diverse attitudes of key civilian forces and figures towards the disintegrating regime are the subject of Chapter 4, with the main focus on the divisions between the largest Muslim groups. The inability of civilian elites to form a united

front against the regime and assume control of the government facilitated the emergence of the student movement and popular resistance as the main vehicles of opposition. The collapse of the regime amidst violence and societal protest left a power vacuum that was filled by residual components of the New Order, with serious consequences for the democratic transition.

The third part of the book discusses the dynamics of civil-military relations in the post-authoritarian transition between 1998 and 2004. Against this backdrop, Chapter 5 evaluates the process of military reform in the early post-Suharto period in the context of its high levels of political uncertainty. Subsequently, Chapter 6 maintains that in the early phase of the transition, the intense rivalry between important Muslim leaders and their constituencies offered the armed forces frequent opportunities to intervene in the political process. Most importantly, TNI determined the outcome of the 2001 fight over the Wahid presidency, which had involved the followers of Indonesia's two largest Islamic organizations. Finally, the fourth part concentrates on the period of democratic consolidation which began with Yudhoyono's election in 2004. Chapter 7 argues that Yudhoyono's decision to sideline conservative officers from the armed forces and settle the Aceh conflict peacefully contributed to the improvement of civilian oversight of the military after 2004. In the same vein, Chapter 8 explains the interrelationship between the declining political tensions in the Muslim community, the general stabilization of the civilian polity, and the marginalization of the military from political affairs under Yudhoyono's presidency. The conclusion then pulls the various narrative and analytical tracks together, reflecting on the state of civil-military relations in Indonesia ten years after Suharto's fall and pointing to the implications of the findings of this book for the theoretical discourse on the role of militaries in political transitions.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Amien Rais at a public rally in Bandung, 5 June 1998, personal notes by the author.
- <sup>2</sup> "Amien Rais Pilih Wapres dari Kalangan TNI", *Kompas*, 13 September 2003.
- <sup>3</sup> The DPR is Indonesia's parliament, while the MPR is nominally the highest institutional authority in the country. Under the New Order, the MPR consisted of the members of the DPR, regional representatives, and functional groups. Every five years, it elected a president and vice-president, and issued policy directives for the government in the form of decrees and regulations that ranked

- higher than the legislation passed by the DPR. As a result of the constitutional amendments adopted in 2002, however, the MPR has lost its electoral powers and its legislative authority. It now comprises the members of the DPR and the DPD (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, Regional Representative Council), a senate-like body consisting of representatives from Indonesia's provinces. The post-2002 MPR only swears in the president elected directly by the people, and can be part of impeachment proceedings if initiated by the DPR.
- <sup>4</sup> This element of democratic control has been referred to as “horizontal control”, as opposed to the “vertical control” exercised by formal state institutions (Born, Caparina, and Haltiner 2002, p. 11).
- <sup>5</sup> For theories that emphasize the corporate interests of the military, see Abrahamson (1972), Perlmutter (1977), and Alagappa (2001*c*).
- <sup>6</sup> The following typology of states with different levels of military intervention is largely based on Perlmutter (1977) and Nordlinger (1977).
- <sup>7</sup> Gareth Jenkins (2001, p. 84) has asserted that by “January 2001, the military continued to insist that the twin threats to Kemalism from Kurdish nationalism and radical Islam had been contained rather than defeated”. In 2007, the Turkish military temporarily prevented the election of a devout Muslim as head of state, but could do nothing to stop his party from winning the subsequent parliamentary elections, which was widely interpreted as an act of popular defiance against the military.
- <sup>8</sup> Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 52–53) defined sultanism as a form of government in which “there is high fusion by the ruler of the private and the public. The sultanistic polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan. In this domain there is no rule of law and there is low institutionalization.” Linz and Stepan contrasted sultanistic rule with authoritarianism, in which “there may or may not be a rule of law, space for semi-opposition, or space for regime moderates who might establish links with opposition moderates...”
- <sup>9</sup> Larry Diamond (1994, pp. 7–8) has defined political culture, based on Finer's assumptions, as “a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system”.
- <sup>10</sup> In some of his later works, Huntington (1996, p. 9), for example, has postulated a correlation between per capita income and the possibility of military coups. Countries with a per capita gross domestic product of US\$3,000 or above are very unlikely to witness successful coups, while countries with per capita levels of below US\$500 are extremely prone to such forms of military intervention.
- <sup>11</sup> Samuel Decalo (1998, p. 199), for example, doubts the effectiveness of the “economic deterrence of the West in case of military coups”. While it helped in the short term to create some of Africa's “New Democracies”, its failures are clearly “visible in the pattern of mutinies and attempted coups that have punctuated the rhythm of political life in the 1990s”.

- <sup>12</sup> A summary of the country classifications can be found in Herd and Tracy (2006, pp. 552–53).
- <sup>13</sup> This definition is presented in Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002, p. 14).
- <sup>14</sup> There are, of course, other important reasons for choosing Muslim groups as the main focus when studying conflicts in Indonesia's civilian realm. First, Islamic groups represent the largest segment of Indonesian society, both numerically and in terms of political significance. Consequently, the study of their interests, relationships, and conflicts will reflect general patterns of political interaction in Indonesia. Second, the discussion of Indonesia's civil-military affairs between 1998 and 2008 will point to the critical relevance of the Wahid presidency in the transitional process. Wahid's rise and fall was closely related to the factionalism and alliance-building between Islamic groups, and facilitated intervention opportunities for the armed forces that led to a consolidation of military interests under the Megawati presidency. Third, the study of intra-Islamic relationships and conflicts will inherently extend to other socio-political segments. The central position of Islamic forces in Indonesia's political landscape makes them a main target for the build-up of cross-constituency coalitions. In fact, Islamic forces and secular-nationalist groups have cooperated more often than Muslim-based groups among themselves. The role of secular-nationalist constituencies is, therefore, an integral part of any study of the relationship between forces of political Islam.